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INTRODUCTION
Like any other business venture, insurance companies face a possibility of failure. 
When an insurer does fail, it may be financially unable to meet all of its debts and 
become “insolvent.”1 An insolvent insurer is often unable to satisfy its contractual 
obligations for covered claims,2 leaving policyholders and beneficiaries to bear costs 
that otherwise should have been covered by their insurer.3 Insurance guarantee 
schemes (IGS) act as a consumer safety net, providing “last-resort protection” by
paying claims in full or in part when an insurer cannot or by transferring the insured’s 
portfolio.4  
                                                                                                                
  Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Juris Doctor 2018; B.A., 2014, Indiana 
University. Special thanks to my family, especially Dana and Joseph, for their constant sup-
port. Particular thanks to Ms. Barbara F. Cox, a tireless mentor. Finally, thanks to the hard-
working staff of the Indiana Law Journal.  
1. Insolvent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also OXERA CONSULTING 
LTD., INSURANCE GUARANTEE SCHEMES IN THE EU, at i (2007), https://www.oxera.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Insurance-guarantee-schemes-in-the-EU.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KZ8-
9LPA]. 
2. OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 1, at 5.  
3. Id. 
4. European Commission Memorandum MEMO/10/320, Insurance Guarantee Schemes 
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Despite the facial appeal of the consumer protection that an IGS offers, consumer 
protection through IGS varies from country to country within the European Union 
(EU), and many EU member states do not have any IGS. As of 2007, only thirteen 
of the then twenty-seven EU member nations had established some sort of IGS.5 And, 
as of 2010, only twelve of the then thirty members of the greater European Union-
European Economic Area (EU-EEA) operated general IGS.6 Within the EU-EEA, 
one-third of the entire insurance market and over half of non-life insurance policies 
were not covered by any IGS protection.7 While states are often not prompted to 
establish IGS until an insurance failure actually occurs,8 the recent financial crisis 
has drawn attention to the risk posed by unprotected insurance markets.9 As a result, 
in 2010 the European Commission published a White Paper setting forth “a coherent 
framework for EU action on IGS protection” and recommending the harmonization 
of EU IGS.10  
The idea of harmonizing the laws of the EU member nations is in no way new. 
The banking and securities sectors, for example, are already subject to EU legislation 
establishing mandatory guidelines.11 As the economies of the world’s many nations 
become increasingly entwined,12 a coordinated approach to legal problems like har-
monization has a strong appeal. However, harmonization is far from a panacea, and 
its costs must be weighed alongside its benefits.  
                                                                                                                
(IGS)—Frequently Asked Questions (July 12, 2010); OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 1,
at 5. 
5.  OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 1, at 5. The 2007 Oxera report was written 
before Croatia joined the EU on July 1, 2013. EU Member Countries in Brief, EUR. UNION,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en [https://perma.cc 
/Y466-WKXX].   
6. European Commission Memorandum MEMO/10/320, supra note 4.
7. Id. 
8. See OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 1, at 9. 
9. Commission White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, at 3, COM (2010) 370 
final (July 12, 2010) [hereinafter White Paper on IGS].  
10. Id. at 2. 
11. Commission Summary of the Impact Assessment: Accompanying Document to the 
White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, at 2, SEC (2010) 841 (July 12, 2010) [herein-
after Summary of the Impact Assessment].
12. A wide variety of viewpoints have been advanced as to the benefits and detriments of 
economic globalization. Of late, special interest has been given to the future of globalization 
in light of changing attitudes in the United States and the West. For just a few of many exam-
ples, see Peter S. Goodman, More Wealth, More Jobs, but Not for Everyone: What Fuels the 
Backlash on Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29 
/business/economy/more-wealth-more-jobs-but-not-for-everyone-what-fuels-the-backlash-
on-trade.html [https://perma.cc/5SGM-E55B]; Steven Rattner, Opinion, Let’s Admit It: 
Globalization Has Losers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011),  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16 
/opinion/sunday/lets-admit-it-globalization-has-losers.html [https://perma.cc/U73X-CGSR];
Fareed Zakaria, Opinion, Everyone Seems To Agree Globalization Is a Sin. They’re Wrong.,
WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/everyone-seems-to-
agree-globalization-is-a-sin-theyre-wrong/2017/01/19/49bded68-de8b-11e6-918c-99ede3c8 
cafa_story.html [https://perma.cc/K86H-QXUK]; Global Trade Forecast To Pick Up but 
Uncertainties Linger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 12, 2017, 7:03 AM), https:// 
www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-04-12/world-trade-growth-forecast-to-pick-
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Because of their consumer-focused mission, IGS highlight the countervailing in-
terests at tension during harmonization and some of the reasons harmonization may 
not be palatable to EU member states in all matters. Yet, this Note proposes that IGS 
within the EU illustrate some of the traits that make an international problem ripe for 
harmonization. 
In Part I, this Note considers the mechanisms of harmonization and the regulatory 
and fairness policy concerns that harmonization is designed to address. Part II ex-
plores some of the problems harmonization can create, with an eye toward how those 
problems manifest in the IGS context. Finally, Part III discusses how IGS address an 
urgent and inevitable problem that affects actors in the insurance market at every 
level. By analyzing comments on the Commission’s White Paper, Part III proposes 
that these three factors—convergence of stakeholder interest, inevitability, and ur-
gency—are key to understanding when member states, EU citizens, and industry ac-
tors may embrace harmonization in spite of its potential pitfalls. 
I. HARMONIZATION AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING MECHANISM
A. Mechanics and Function 
The EU has a variety of legal mechanisms at its disposal, each of which carries 
different legal weight. Some of these mechanisms allow the EU to act with binding 
legal force. A “regulation,” for example, is a binding legislative act that is applied in 
its entirety across the EU.13 A “directive” is also a legislative act, but it merely sets 
out a goal that EU members must achieve.14 It establishes the ends of the regulation, 
but leaves the means up to each member nation. Each member must create their own 
legal framework to comply with the directive’s requirements.15 A “decision” is bind-
ing, but only on those toward whom it is specifically addressed, such as an individual 
company or member state.16
The EU can also influence member states with nonbinding acts. EU institutions 
can issue a “recommendation,” a nonbinding expression of the institutions’ views 
                                                                                                                
up-this-year-and-next [https://perma.cc/7UBX-MGB4].
13. Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/eu-law/legal-acts_en [hereinafter EUROPEAN UNION]. For an example, see Regulation 
2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2015 O.J. (L 83) 16 (establishing, in 
part, a Committee on Safeguards to surveil non-EU imports and implement safeguard 
measures to protect the EU market).  
14. EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 13; see, e.g., Directive 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 81 (instructing member states to “ensure 
that adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance with th[e] Directive,” which 
aimed to strengthen certain consumer rights).  
15. EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 13. 
16. Id.; see, e.g., Joint Decision of the European Commission and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, JOIN (2015) 32 final (Aug. 27, 2015) 
(affecting only those organizations engaged in EU counter-terrorism work).  
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and suggestions.17 Or, they can issue “opinions,” nonbinding comments about a law 
currently being crafted.18
The EU sometimes uses these mechanisms to harmonize legislation across EU 
member nations. In this context,19 harmonization refers to the EU’s use of legislative 
authority to set uniform standards for all member nations. EU legislation can be de-
signed to achieve “minimum harmonization” or “maximum harmonization.” 
Minimum harmonization refers to EU-wide standards that set a regulatory “floor,” a 
minimum set of requirements that must be met by each member state.20 Maximum 
harmonization, on the other hand, establishes a regulatory “floor” and “ceiling.”21 In 
other words, maximum harmonization requires that member states apply the rules 
established by the EU, but also prevents them from establishing their own additional 
rules.22
By harmonizing legislation across member nations, the EU aims to achieve a level 
of efficiency, clarity, and predictability across Europe.23 Currently, IGS offer une-
qual protection to policyholders across the EU.24 Because of this inequity, IGS are a 
good lens through which to examine the possible benefits that a clearer, more effi-
cient, and more predictable regulatory scheme can bring. 
B. Harmonization in the IGS Context 
There are significant differences between the national guarantee schemes that ex-
ist in EU member states,25 and less than half of EU member states have any insurance 
guarantee scheme at all.26 This lack of uniformity means, first, that consumers within 
the EU are unevenly protected from the risks of insurance failure, and, second, that 
cross-border competition may be distorted27 by member states’ varying policies.28  
Policyholders are arguably the biggest stakeholders in the creation of an EU-wide 
guarantee scheme. When an insurer fails in a member nation without an IGS, policy-
holders may be left to bear costs that would otherwise be paid by their insurers. This, 
                                                                                                                
17. EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 13; see, e.g., Council Recommendation 2015/C 250/01, 
2015 O.J. (C 250) 1, 2 (“welcoming” the use of cross-border videoconferencing).   
18. EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 13; see, e.g., Opinion of the Committee of the Regions 
on the Clean Air Policy Package for Europe, 2014 O.J. (C 415) 23 (expressing, inter alia,
“regrets” that a proposed clean air policy is not synchronized with an existing directive). 
19. This is in contrast to the broader view used by some commentators. See, e.g., infra 
note 48.
20. Stephen Weatherill, Maximum Versus Minimum Harmonization, in FROM SINGLE 
MARKET TO ECONOMIC UNION 176 (Niamh Nic Shuibhne & Laurence W. Gormley eds., 2012). 
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Larry Catá Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An 
Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems, 4 
TULSA. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 185, 190 (1997).  
24. See infra Part I.B. 
25. Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra note 11.  
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  
28. Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra note 11.
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of course, reduces the policyholders’ personal wealth,29 but the ramifications do not 
stop there. When consumers are unprotected during an insurance failure, public fi-
nances may be weakened.30 Further, a decrease in consumers’ confidence in the in-
surance and financial markets may even slow the economy and cause financial dis-
ruption.31 A drop in consumer confidence is particularly problematic in the EU cross-
border context because a disturbance in the EU internal market32 carries the risk of 
triggering disputes between member states as they try to allocate the failed insurer’s 
losses among themselves.33
The burden placed on policyholders in the event of insurer insolvency also raises 
questions of fairness. Inaction by the EU would leave uneven levels of policyholder 
protection in place between the member states.34 This means that a policyholder in a 
member state without IGS may be left unprotected, while a policyholder with a sim-
ilar policy in a neighboring member state would be protected by a guarantee scheme. 
Policyholders could theoretically choose insurers and policies that gave them the 
benefit of IGS protection, but a caveat emptor approach would place an unrealisti-
cally heavy burden on consumers to make insurance-related decisions based on their 
knowledge of IGS and the complex insurance market.35 Leaving EU citizens to wade 
through these dense regulations and exposed to disparate guarantee scheme protec-
tion is puzzling given the EU’s ostensible aim to “boost growth, employment and 
social cohesion in the EU” and given the right of EU citizens “to study, live, shop, 
work and retire in any EU country.”36
The problem with varying levels of consumer protection is especially clear when 
considering the cross-border sale of insurance. The modern market can create any 
number of circumstances that can give rise to cross-border sales. An individual living 
in one member state may own a second home in another state. An insurer may wish 
to open a branch in another state or to convert a subsidiary into a branch. The cross-
border sale of insurance in an unharmonized EU can create an unusual circumstance 
where two consumers who have identical contracts with a cross-border insurer end 
up facing different loss consequences based purely on their country of residence.37
A lack of harmonization also allows for possible distortion of competition within 
the insurance market. Domestic insurers and nondomestic insurers are not on a level 
                                                                                                                
29. Id.  
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. The internal market refers to the EU single market policy allowing “the free move-
ment of goods, services, capital and persons” between member states. Internal Market,
EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/internal_market.html?root_default= 
SUM_1_CODED%3D24 [https://perma.cc/H6TZ-AN6F]. See generally Commission 
Citizens’ Summary: Single Market Act II, at 1, Ref. Ares (2016) 843099 (Feb. 17, 2016) 
[hereinafter Citizens’ Summary]; Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, at 4–5, COM (2012) 573 final (Oct. 3, 2012).  
33. Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra note 11. 
34. See id. at 3. 
35. See id.
36. Citizens’ Summary, supra note 32.
37. OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 1, at iv.  
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playing field when one may benefit from the existence of IGS in their home country 
while the other does not. The effects on competition may be twofold. First, consum-
ers may prefer to buy policies covered by IGS.38 Second, insurers required to make 
payments into IGS may be at a competitive disadvantage compared with insurers 
who are not required to do so.39
Harmonizing IGS presents a possible solution to these problems. Consumers in 
member nations with no guarantee scheme or a weak guarantee scheme stand to gain 
a minimum level of protection,40 and a loss of confidence in the market due to an 
insurance failure would thereby be avoided. A minimum level of protection would 
also eliminate the largest roadblocks to fair cross-border competition by minimizing 
the impact of any consumer preference for IGS-protected policies and by requiring 
all insurers to make at least some payments into IGS.41
II. COSTS OF IGS HARMONIZATION
Of course, the rosy picture of harmonization painted in Part I does not capture the 
entire reality. The implementation of EU-wide regulations is not a simple matter of 
swapping out unequal protections for fairer, more uniform ones. While harmoniza-
tion may help achieve a unity of approach across the EU, it comes with its own costs. 
A. Democracy Deficit: A By-Product of Harmonization? 
One notable cost of harmonization is the loss of local preference. Whenever a 
decision is taken out of the hands of national legislatures and is instead determined 
within the EU framework, individual citizens of member states are attenuated from 
the decision-making process.42 The laws of a given group of states are therefore al-
lowed to bleed into and dominate the laws of another sovereign state, which may not 
                                                                                                                
38. Id. at 137.  
39. Id. While it is necessary to acknowledge that these market forces would have oppos-
ing effects, the overall impact is not yet known. Analysis of the potential impact is necessarily 
speculative, as “[t]here is no direct evidence available to date to suggest that the impact on 
cross-border competition is significant, either from the demand or the supply side.” Id. This is 
due in part to the relatively limited activity of cross-border insurers. The point is not moot, 
however, as the impact may become greater as cross-border activity continues to increase. Id.
40. Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra note 11, at 5.  
41. Of course, this would not eliminate all the differences between IGS in member states, 
and problems would remain as to the amount of coverage, the financial burden on insurers in 
different countries, etc. Nevertheless, harmonization would at least have the effect of making 
the differences between countries a mere matter of degree of coverage, rather than the exist-
ence or lack of any coverage at all.   
42. The “main decision-making procedure used for adopting EU legislation,” known as 
the ordinary legislative procedure, requires that both the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union agree on legislative proposals, which are offered by the European 
Commission. The Ordinary Legislative Procedure, EUR. COUNCIL EUR. UNION, http://www
.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ordinary-legislative-procedure [https:// 
perma.cc/QKH5-4QG7].
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feel the new regulation is in its best interest. Harmonization, therefore, arguably cre-
ates a “democracy deficit” that deprives the people of their right to govern their own 
affairs at the national level.43
This aspect of the democracy deficit is not unexpected. The EU is predicated on 
the transfer of certain powers from the sovereign governments of member states to a 
transnational authority.44 In order to enjoy the benefits of European uniformity, mem-
ber states have granted the EU increasing influence over their domestic affairs.45 The 
EU’s authority now touches on many aspects of the lives of member states’ citizens.46
As member states expand the authority of the EU and empower the EU to resolve 
various transnational problems, they necessarily “erode” their own sovereignty as 
nation states.47 This premise can be seen in harmonization within the EU. Legally 
binding regulations and directives aimed at harmonizing the laws of the various 
member states must carry the weight of domestic law, and therefore must remove the 
power of choice from individual member nations.48 This mechanism arguably allows 
nations in the legislative majority to export their own laws into other nations on the 
losing side of the vote. In this sense, harmonization may be characterized as a form 
of indirect extraterritoriality.49 Indeed, the desire to make the laws of multiple states 
uniform has even been criticized in some contexts as an extension of colonial atti-
tudes because harmonization can empower stronger, more developed nations to im-
pose legal, political, and cultural norms on less developed nations.50
                                                                                                                
43. See Paul D. Marquardt, Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and 
Constitutionalism in the European Union, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 265, 265–66 (1994).  
44. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 10, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 13, 20 [hereinafter TEU] (“Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the 
European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads 
of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically 
accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.”).
45. Doris Estelle Long, “Globalization”: A Future Trend or a Satisfying Mirage?, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 329–30 (2001).
46. Id. at 330.  
47. See id. at 328–29. 
48. See Long, supra note 45, at 329–30; Weatherill, supra note 20.  
49. Of course, this exportation of laws through the EU structure is not extraterritoriality 
in the conventional sense. Tonya L. Putnam, for example, defines extraterritoriality as the 
claiming by domestic-level institutions of direct regulatory authority over cross-border trans-
actions. Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. 
Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L ORG. 459, 459–60 (2009). Under 
Putnam’s definition, then, indirect extraterritoriality is impossible. For the purposes of this 
Note, extraterritoriality should be understood to mean the application of one nation’s laws 
outside its territorial borders.  
50. Long, supra note 45, at 316–17. Here, harmonization is defined much differently than 
should be understood in the rest of this work. Rather than referring to a specific EU mecha-
nism, Long refers to harmonization in the “broader sense of an attempt to achieve agreement 
on multinational universal concepts” within the intellectual property context. Id. at 316 n.10. 
Nevertheless, Long’s observation that colonial or imperialistic attitudes are manifest in the 
general harmonization of intellectual property regulations suggests that it may be worthwhile 
to consider the same criticism in the context of the “sovereign concessions” of the EU. Id. at 
329. 
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 Similar criticism has also been levied against the EU based on a perceived lack 
of transparency in EU procedure and the lack of opportunity for citizens to engage 
with the development of the EU legislative acts that will ultimately affect them.51
Importantly, the EU has made efforts to increase transparency52 and has embraced 
language emphasizing the importance of openness53 in keeping with the Treaty on 
European Union’s (TEU) guarantee of citizen participation in EU affairs.54 The EU’s 
multilingual website is one way EU matters are made accessible to the general pub-
lic.55 Citizens can stream videos of meetings, access legislative and prelegislative 
documents, and download a wide variety of literature—from white papers to press 
releases—that explores and explains EU issues.56 Even candidly published infor-
mation, however, may not reach EU citizens in practice. It can be difficult for indi-
viduals to parse the huge volume of publications relating to EU policymaking.57 Even 
more importantly, some policy issues may be more “visible” to the public than oth-
ers, and the way in which EU institutions frame policy issues can have a major impact 
on those issues’ visibility.58 With this reality always at work in the background, the 
EU solicits comments from EU players—including private citizens—on matters of 
policy.59 However, it is not clear that citizens’ contributions are as influential on pol-
icymaking as those of commercial and governmental actors.60
Ultimately, this Note does not intend to debate the adequacy of the EU’s efforts 
to increase transparency or to fully engage with the body of scholarship exploring 
the EU democracy deficit. Rather, by highlighting one of the problems inherent in 
European harmonization, the democracy deficit, this Note acknowledges that there 
are reasons EU member states may choose to resist harmonization and offers an anal-
ysis of the countervailing factors that may nevertheless encourage member states to 
embrace it.  
                                                                                                                
51. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Transparency and Financial Regulation in the European 
Union: Crisis and Complexity, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1171, 1171–75 (2012).    
52. See id. at 1176–82.  
53. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 15, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 54 [hereinafter TFEU] (“In order to pro-
mote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. . . . Any citizen of 
the Union . . . shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies . . . .”). 
54. TEU, supra note 44, art. 10, § 3 (“Every citizen shall have the right to participate in 
the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible 
to the citizen.”).
55. EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu [https://perma.cc/TWJ7-TM6J].
56. Bradley, supra note 51, at 1177–78. 
57. Id. at 1179.
58. Id. at 1179–80. 
59. See, e.g., Consultation on the White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/whitepaper-on-igs/index_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4VLR-GYSR].  
60. See id. (“All citizens and organisations are welcome to contribute to this consultation. 
Contributions are particularly sought from market participants, national governments and na-
tional competent authorities.”). 
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It should also be noted that the surrender of some sovereignty is not necessarily a 
negative consequence of harmonization; it brings benefits as well. Where an EU reg-
ulation or directive harmonizes the law pertaining to a legal protection, harmoniza-
tion can compel a member nation with nonexistent or weak laws to increase protec-
tion61—as is the case with IGS. The individuals, corporations, or other entities that 
benefit from that legal protection are “winners” in the sovereignty-uniformity 
tradeoff. 
Still, harmonization can implicate closely related issues of national and cultural 
identity that may not be overcome by a detached analysis of harmonization’s empir-
ical benefits. Like any effort to increase uniformity, harmonization can create the 
perception that an unwanted homogenizing is taking place.62 This perception, paired 
with the perceived democracy deficit discussed above, has led the Commission of 
the European Communities to acknowledge that the EU is seen both as too “remote 
and at the same time too intrusive.”63 Individuals who perceive that they must sacri-
fice cultural identity in order to participate more fully in a global market may resist 
processes that contribute to that market.64
Of course, any discussion of national or cultural identity must acknowledge that 
members of the European Union are voluntarily associated. Where a government has 
relinquished part of its sovereign power through a fair, noncoercive process—such 
as the adoption of a treaty—the democratic process may not be circumvented at all.65
Rather, the sovereign chooses to accept the authority of an international forum, and 
its powers are not usurped.66
B. Harmonization’s Administrative Challenges
Harmonization can present a serious administrative challenge to member states as 
they work to implement and comply with EU legislative acts. As EU regulations 
increase, the inevitable consequence is that national regulations perish.67 And when 
it is necessary to dismantle a large swatch of extant policies within a member state 
the “simpler” EU regulation can be quite burdensome to individual member states.
In other words, “the more ‘coherent’ the EU regime, the less coherent national sys-
tems may become.”68 This is especially true where maximum harmonization is em-
ployed. The onus falls on the legal system of the member states to vet the entire 
corpus of law to determine which of their local regulations are affected by the EU 
                                                                                                                
61. See Doris Estelle Long, “Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies of 
Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 251 (2002).  
62. Long, supra note 45, at 337. 
63. Commission White Paper on European Governance, 2001 O.J. (C 287) 1, 1.  
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regulations and must be eliminated or reworked.69 In addition to being a presumably 
work-intensive process, such dismantling of domestic law “radically shifts the pat-
tern of European law-making away from a cooperative model towards a more hier-
archical pattern.”70 These changes could be viewed as the very type of dereliction of 
national identity discussed above,71 a concern that “has particular resonance in the 
context of the cherished but imperiled ‘integrity’ of domestic legal systems.”72  
These problems can be expected in the IGS context as well. Minimum harmoni-
zation of IGS would mean creating a floor for consumer protection,73 a rule that 
would require the operation of IGS in each member state. Maximum harmonization, 
on the other hand, would establish the upper and lower limit of consumer protection. 
Both methods of harmonization stand to implicate the more emotional, identity-
based problems of homogenization.74 The result of a more drastic change to maxi-
mum harmonization would be that, in member states where guarantee scheme pro-
tections are especially strong, those states might be required to offer less protection 
to consumers to avoid violating an EU directive.75 EU IGS therefore illustrate how 
increased regulation can act as a double-edged sword for consumers. While many 
would benefit from a directive requiring the operation of a guarantee scheme in each 
member state, excessive regulation could harm other consumers who currently enjoy 
a higher degree of protection.
C. Monetary Costs of Harmonization in the IGS Context 
Finally, harmonization can carry monetary costs for member states that must com-
ply with EU regulations. By way of example, harmonized IGS would impose mone-
tary costs on member states without a guarantee scheme—or at least on insurers 
within those states—once a guarantee scheme was implemented. Because of the var-
ying IGS structures, the differing scopes of coverage offered under IGS, and the 
number and nature of failures handled by a scheme, the estimated expense of oper-
ating a guarantee scheme is difficult to predict.76 Regardless, the costs imposed on 
insurers to fund and administer IGS are likely to be passed on to consumers.77
III. THE ATTRACTION OF HARMONIZATION IN THE IGS CONTEXT
As illustrated in Part I, the harmonization of IGS in the EU stands to bring a num-
ber of benefits to consumers and insurers alike. Nevertheless, harmonization carries 
its own challenges, as discussed in Part II. Despite these challenges, many of the 
comments submitted to the EU by the various players in the international insurance 
market—discussed throughout this Part—expressed openness to harmonization. By 
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analyzing these comments, this Note proposes harmonization may be palatable in the 
IGS context because differences in consumer protection in various member states 
exacerbate an inevitable, urgent problem that affects a wide range of actors in the 
insurance market.  
A. Background: Synopsis of the EU White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes 
In December of 2010, the European Commission issued a White Paper outlining 
its position on the need for harmonized regulation of IGS within the EU.78 Making 
special note of the impact of the financial crisis on the insurance industry,79 the 
Commission recognized that policyholder protection in the EU is insufficient or un-
even in many member states.80 The Commission decried the existing EU guarantee 
scheme landscape’s negative effect on market stability and the uneven playing field 
it creates for insurers competing across borders.81 The Commission recommended a 
binding directive achieving minimum harmonization across EU member states.82 In 
closing, the Commission “call[ed] upon all interested parties to provide their views,” 
so that any feedback could be incorporated into an eventual legislative proposal.83
The Commission received sixty-four responses to this public call for comment.84
Responses were received from six categories of respondents: citizens, national and 
European interests groups, industry, public authorities, national insurance guarantee 
schemes, and others.85 While acknowledging that responses to an EU white paper 
cannot possibly represent the viewpoints of all stakeholders in the harmonization 
debate,86 this Note posits that stakeholder comments can provide insight into what 
considerations actors in cross-border markets find important and what legal problems 
may be ripe for harmonization as a result. 
B. The Interests of Each of the Major Stakeholders in Insurance Guarantee Scheme 
Harmonization Coincide 
While the borders of nation-states impose an artificial sort of heterogeneity on the 
insurance market, the reality is that the insurance market operates with little regard 
for geographical boundaries. One insurer or consumer may have a legal interest in 
more than one state’s guarantee scheme and the ever-increasing ease of travel, com-
munication, and cross-border business can create and complicate conflicts in the in-
surance market. Indeed, the sale of cross-border insurance is on the steady rise.87 As 
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such, a wide range of actors is implicated when consumers of insurance are inade-
quately insulated from the risk of insurer insolvency.  
The motive for EU harmonization is primarily to protect the individual consumer 
who has entered into a contract with the expectation that he will be protected from 
certain risks,88 but consumer protection comes with the additional benefit of building 
(or maintaining) market confidence.89 Harmonization also creates conditions that 
foster a single market in insurance.90 The result is that actors whose interests would 
typically be at odds—for example, an insurer and a policyholder or a business and 
government regulators—actually have a shared interest in establishing IGS. 
The individual’s interest in well-functioning IGS is clear. Individual consumers 
are the end beneficiaries of payments made by IGS,91 and it is their policies and 
claims that are at issue when IGS is triggered. They are also affected by any change 
in premiums that may result from the existence or lack of IGS in a given market. It 
is unsurprising, then, that one of the two responses received from citizens lambasted 
the unequal coverage currently provided by European IGS.92 More interesting is the 
fact that this citizen was not alone in clamoring for greater consumer protection.  
International insurers and other commercial entities are stockholders in the suc-
cess of an EU guarantee scheme because they stand to benefit from a level playing 
field as they compete with other insurers in European markets.93 For example, an 
insurer that must pay ex ante into IGS may feel disadvantaged relative to a similarly 
situated insurer that does not have to pay into IGS. Conversely, an insurer in a state 
with strong IGS protection may have an advantage over an insurer writing business 
without IGS because consumers perceive that IGS make the insurer-insured relation-
ship less risky. As a result, in addition to lauding harmonization’s benefit to consum-
ers, insurers supported the proposals in the White Paper because of the anticipated 
increase in market stability and in order to encourage a level playing field in the 
single market.94  
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Finally, government actors also have reason to be concerned with inequities in 
insurance-consumer protection from state to state. Of course, IGS release national 
governments from any obligation to step in in the event of insolvency or to shift the 
cost of unfulfilled claims to taxpayers.95 Still, government actors expressed concerns 
for more than the “bottom line” of insurer insolvency. Government commenters 
acknowledged the weighty implications of international financial regulation on the 
insurance industry and the potential impact not only on individual consumers of in-
surance, but also on society as a whole.96  Government interests therefore represent 
the intersection of the interests of both the consumer and the insurance provider. 
Internationally, the EU’s aims as a driver of the European economy97 are served by 
increased confidence in international financial institutions, which encourages eco-
nomic growth. 
These comments illustrate that, although consumer protection is at the root of ef-
forts to harmonize EU IGS, increased consumer protection is not in the interest of 
the consumer alone. Rather, interest in harmonization reaches “vertically” in scale
from the individual consumer all the way to international governing bodies and 
stretches “horizontally” in scale to encompass both commercial and governmental 
entities.98 This unusual convergence of interests paves the way for international har-
monization. Each actor is further tied to the others by their shared fate under the 
single market philosophy of the European Union. 
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C. Commenters Noted the Inevitable Consequences of a Lack of Harmonized IGS 
An additional aspect of the appeal of harmonization in the EU IGS context is that 
IGS address an inevitable problem. Experts agree that no amount of insurance regu-
lation can completely remove the risk that an insurer will fail.99 Regulators therefore 
face the challenge of preparing to protect consumers when—not merely if—an in-
surer insolvency occurs. In its White Paper, the Commission made clear that “[t]he 
importance of introducing an IGS depends on the risk that insurance companies will 
go bankrupt, and the potential impact of such bankruptcies on consumers.”100
 Both insurers and public agencies identified this rationale as an important factor 
in their endorsements of IGS harmonization. The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak 
Republic, for example, explicitly stated that the impossibility of a zero-failure system 
was “consider[ed] highly important” in its analysis.101 Similarly, providing an in-
surer’s perspective, MetLife noted in its comments that the EU’s most recent regu-
latory scheme aimed at preventing insurer insolvency “in [no] way negates the need 
to look again at the provision of IGS across Europe and how they can help contribute 
to policy-holder protection.”102
D. Commenters Analyzed the Urgency of Problems Created by Differing EU IGS 
Commenters’ rationale for accepting IGS harmonization often concerned the im-
mediacy and seriousness of potential consequences from an insurance failure—con-
cepts that together I have termed “urgency.” 
Some commenters’ sense of urgency seemed to stem from a sense that unequal 
IGS protection across the EU is unfair to consumers and that consumer protection 
should be afforded where possible.103 For example, even while suggesting that IGS 
would only be necessary to protect consumers in the rarest of circumstances, the 
Swedish Ministry of Finance stated that a policyholder’s financial burden in such a 
circumstance would be “untenable.”104 A citizen commenter lamented “inequality in 
[IGS] protection in Europe,” and praised the Commission’s White Paper for offering 
a “long overdue” solution.105 Other commenters were concerned with the financial 
risk and potential destabilizing effect of insurer insolvency.106 This concern seems 
well rooted in fact, as insurer insolvency may pose up to €46.5 billion in potential 
costs to policyholders in a single year.107 The Financial Services Consumer Panel 
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observed in its comments that a “wait-and-see” approach was unlikely to satisfacto-
rily address the problem because neither policyholders nor insurers were likely to 
self-regulate the market.108 While consumer choice could theoretically pressure in-
surers into markets with IGS or to innovate new ways of mitigating the risk of insurer 
insolvency, such a solution appears unlikely. For a market-driven solution to materi-
alize, consumers would need access to the facts of IGS and the markets in which they 
function. However, IGS work quietly in the background of the insurance industry, 
and there is a notable lack of transparency for consumers.109
Comments submitted by actors that rejected the notion of a harmonized guarantee 
scheme also show that a problem must be urgent to be considered for harmonization. 
For example, one rationale given by public authorities that rejected the guarantee 
scheme directive proposed in the White Paper was that, unlike a deposit guarantee 
scheme,110 IGS is not necessary to protect financial stability.111 Another rationale 
given for rejecting IGS harmonization was the existence of other domestic proce-
dures used to address insurance failures.112 We see, then, that public authorities that 
do not see a need for harmonized IGS are skeptical of the impact of an insurance 
failure or are confident that existing procedures can adequately cope with any fail-
ures—in other words, they do not perceive that the variety of approaches to IGS 
presents an urgent problem. 
These factors—coinciding interests of various actors, urgency, and inevitability 
—go a long way toward explaining why harmonization is an attractive option in the 
IGS context. While this Note proposes that these three characteristics, which are 
identifiable themes of the comments of actors within the insurance market on the 
EU’s White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, are important to the success of 
any effort to harmonize, it does not suggest that those three criteria are in and of 
themselves sufficient to guarantee successful harmonization. Each instance of har-
monization must be considered in its own context. 
It is important, therefore, to briefly note that the policy best suited for the harmo-
nization of IGS is one of minimum harmonization enforced by a directive. This is, in 
fact, the policy suggested in the European Commission’s White Paper.113 A mini-
mum harmonization directive would establish a consumer-friendly “floor” of protec-
tion while giving the people of each member nation some degree of autonomy. Each 
member state could enhance protections or create protection caps as it sees fit, so 
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long as national regulations comply with the bottom line of the EU directive. In this 
way, a minimum harmonization approach would also prevent the concerns impli-
cated by overzealous regulation, specifically that too much regulation could actually 
decrease consumer protection in some states. In this way, the directive would provide 
the consumer protection that is needed in so many cases without agitating more than 
is necessary the domestic concerns of each member state. 
CONCLUSION
The image of the “long arm of the law” is a familiar one.114 But as travel and 
communication become easier and our world becomes ever more connected, the 
question has become whether that arm can reach across borders, across cultures, and 
across legal systems—and perhaps more importantly, whether it should. Within the 
EU, efforts to harmonize certain areas of law have aimed to bring efficiency, predict-
ability, and clarity to the legal landscape of Europe. 
However, it is not enough that a given policy might be more efficient, more pre-
dictable, or more clear. Where questions of identity, matters of national sovereignty, 
and notions of fairness enter the calculus, it is not sufficient to simply calculate the 
empirical benefits, subtract the costs, and see what remains. Comments on proposed 
EU action in IGS regulation illustrate that stakeholders are concerned with whether 
a problem is urgent and whether that problem has inevitable consequences. Where 
industry players’ interests converge and a particular legal solution offers benefits to 
actors at every level—from consumer to corporation and from individuals to inter-
national governments—an international solution is more likely to be palatable.
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